

**TOP SECRET**

EP

DOCUMENT NO. 42  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒  
☐ DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S O  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2012  
AUTH: KA 1a-2  
DATE: 5 JUN 1980  
REVIEWER:

19 December 1959

Copy No. C 65

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



**TOP SECRET**

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/07/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800420001-2

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/07/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800420001-2

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

19 December 1959

## DAILY BRIEF

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

OK  
USSR-China: A recent lecture to Moscow schoolteachers given by a Soviet specialist on China was notable for its patronizing tone regarding Chinese pretensions. While balancing criticism with praise, the talk as a whole gave the impression that what may nettle the Soviet leaders most about their Chinese allies is their earlier claims to have leaped into a position of near parity with the Soviet Union in progress toward communism. The Chinese were portrayed as "over-enthusiastic," attempting cultural plans that are a "little dreamy and unrealistic" in a poverty-stricken economy that is "17 or 18 years away from the attainment of full socialism." The communes were characterized as a "mess" which is only gradually being straightened out. (Page 1)

25X1

OK  
Communist China - Nepal: Chou En-lai's letter of 17 December to Nehru, like Peiping's earlier communications on the border dispute, makes no substantive concessions but seeks to mollify Indian opinion by portraying the Chinese as eager for immediate negotiations. The Chinese premier suggests that Nehru begin talks with him on 26 December either in China, where there are "no activities hostile to Sino-Indian friendship," or in Rangoon. He rejected Nehru's demands that the Chinese evacuate the Ladakh area and refused to withdraw Chinese forces from Longju without a simultaneous withdrawal of Indian forces from ten other disputed outposts. Nehru endorsed the principle of talks between the two prime ministers in his letter of 16 November, but he probably will not regard Chou's latest counter-proposals as reflecting the "interim understanding" which he set as a condition for such a meeting. (Page 3) (Map)

25X1


## II. ASIA-AFRICA



N<sup>o</sup> Laos: The young reformist group (CDNI) recently excluded from Premier Phoui's new conservative cabinet apparently hopes to re-enter the government by royal decree after the present National Assembly's term lapses on 25 December. A CDNI communiqué criticizing Phoui's recent moves asserts that when the assembly expires all powers revert to the King, and it implies that the King's proper course would be to appoint a new provisional government including the CDNI pending April elections. The King is considered sympathetic to the CDNI. Should he disappoint the reformists on this issue and some compromise not be worked out, they might attempt a power move against Premier Phoui with army backing.

25X1

25X1



19 Dec 59

DAILY BRIEF

ii



25X1

25X1



### III. THE WEST

West Berlin: Mayor Brandt recently expressed his serious apprehension over possible Western moves at a summit meeting which could weaken West Berlin's ties with the Federal Republic. Pointed Soviet attacks on the links between West Berlin and Bonn are at the base of Brandt's concern.

*Nº* \*Replying to these attacks, Brandt urged in a speech to the city assembly on 17 December, that West Berlin's far-reaching integration into the Federal Republic be continued "under the umbrella of the unchallengeable rights of the Western Powers in Berlin." He said his government will be ready at any time to support a four-power agreement concerning a plebiscite in Berlin, "if the USSR wishes to determine the desires of the population of Berlin regarding our city belonging to the Federal Republic."

25X1

25X1  
25X1

19 Dec 59

DAILY BRIEF

iii

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Criticism of China in Soviet Public Lecture

In a lecture on 11 December to Moscow schoolteachers, V. I. Danilov, Soviet specialist on Communist China, sharply criticized certain Chinese practices and views. The lecture, while balancing criticism with praise for genuine accomplishments, was notable for its apparent tone of patronizing belittlement of Chinese pretensions. It supported the impression that what may nettle the Soviet leaders most about their Chinese allies is their earlier claims to have leaped into a position of near parity with the Soviet Union in progress toward communism.

The lecturer alleged that the creation of the communes in 1958 was a "mess" which is only gradually being straightened out. He said the Chinese had enlarged their cooperatives by combining many of them and then had "unfortunately" named them communes, which led poorly educated Communists to conclude that the commune must be some sort of jump to communism. Actually, Moscow has been concerned that a similar conclusion was being drawn by other bloc Communists. Khrushchev had discussed the issue with the Chinese leaders, according to the speaker, and they had redefined the communes as socialist rather than communist, but much confusion still remained to be corrected. In fact, he pointed out, China is still 17 or 18 years away from full socialism, and since the USSR is so far ahead, Soviet aid to China will increase.

Danilov extended criticism of the Chinese into the cultural and educational fields, an area which Moscow had avoided before. The Chinese were said to have a correct basic approach and to have made great advances in the field of culture, but they are over-enthusiastic and their plans are a little dreamy and unrealistic. In this respect, their timetable is off by 20 or 30 years. In addition, their "literature is very sick" because most of their writers joined the "right opposition" in 1957 and have not yet found themselves, and the few good revolutionary writers are too busy with political work to write.

The Chinese standard of living is so poor, Danilov said, that Soviet technicians have to be specially prepared before

25X1


being sent to China. He noted that the Chinese have gone too far in demanding outside physical work of their students, who become so exhausted that they sleep over their studies. Danilov ridiculed Chinese explanations that this extra work is beneficial, saying that this only provokes a Soviet smile because the Russians know the real reason lies in China's poverty.

Apparently because the lecture was intended to describe conditions within China, foreign policy topics were avoided and no mention was made of the Sino-Indian border dispute.

25X1

25X1

25X1





Peiping Calls for Chou-Nehru Meeting

Premier Chou En-lai's letter of 17 December to Prime Minister Nehru, like Peiping's earlier communications on the border dispute, sought to mollify inflamed Indian opinion by portraying the Chinese as eager for immediate negotiations. Chou suggested a meeting with Nehru to begin on 26 December "any place in China," because there are "no activities hostile to Sino-Indian friendship" there, or in Rangoon. Chou expressed agreement with Nehru's proposal that neither side send out patrols from their frontier posts and declared that Peiping had in fact stopped such patrols.

Peiping, however, flatly rejected Nehru's demand that the Chinese troops evacuate Indian-claimed territory in Ladakh, pointing out that the Chinese had made no corresponding demand on New Delhi to withdraw its forces from the Chinese-claimed area south of the McMahon line. As a "partial solution" pending agreement on his proposal of 7 November for a mutual withdrawal along the "entire border," Chou agreed to the evacuation of Chinese forces from Longju outpost in Assam, but only on the condition that the Indians withdraw also from ten other disputed outposts, most of which are located on the western sector of the frontier.

New Delhi is not likely to find Chou's proposals acceptable. Indian doubts regarding Peiping's real intentions in the border area will be reinforced by Chou's insistence on maintaining the "status quo" in Ladakh, thereby retaining possession of large slices of Indian-claimed territory, and by his refusal to withdraw from an outpost forcibly seized by Chinese troops unless Indian forces evacuate ten other points. In his letter of 16 November to Chou, Nehru endorsed the principle of early talks between the two premiers, but stressed that a meeting would be fruitful only after preliminary steps were taken to reach an "interim understanding." Nehru is not likely to regard Chou's reply as fulfilling this condition. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/07/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800420001-2

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/07/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800420001-2

**THE PRESIDENT**

**The Vice President**

**Executive Offices of the White House**

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs  
Scientific Adviser to the President  
Director of the Budget  
Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization  
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination  
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities  
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy  
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

**The Treasury Department**

The Secretary of the Treasury

**The Department of State**

The Secretary of State  
The Under Secretary of State  
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs  
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs  
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration  
The Counselor  
Director, International Cooperation Administration  
The Director of Intelligence and Research

**The Department of Defense**

The Secretary of Defense  
The Deputy Secretary of Defense  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs  
The Secretary of the Army  
The Secretary of the Navy  
The Secretary of the Air Force  
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Commandant, United States Marine Corps  
The Director, The Joint Staff  
Chief of Staff, United States Army  
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy  
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force  
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations  
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army  
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy  
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force  
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe  
Commander in Chief, Pacific

**The Department of Commerce**

The Secretary of Commerce

**Federal Bureau of Investigation**

The Director

**Atomic Energy Commission**

The Chairman

**National Security Agency**

The Director

**National Intelligence Center**

The Director

Approved For Release 2002/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-01975A004800420001-2

**TOP SECRET**

Approved For Release 2002/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-01975A004800420001-2

**TOP SECRET**